- Title: TRUTH COMMISSION: re: Amnesty Application by Brigadier Jack Cronje cont.
- Date: 22nd October 1996
- Summary: TRUTH COMMISSION: re: Amnesty Application by Brigadier Jack Cronje cont.
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- City: JOHANNESBURG
- Country: South Africa
- Reuters ID: 96OCT22R02
- Story Text:TRUTH COMMISSION HEARINGS AT CITY HALL JOHANNESBURG re: Amnesty Application of Brigadier Jack Cronje [former Vlakplaas Commander]
11.07.50 BRIAN CURREN WITH MR VAN DEN BERG REPRESENTING VICTIMS - ZERO HANDGRENADE INCIDENT, NIETVERDIEND MATTER, FAMILIES OF MAKUPE ETC. FAMILIES OF THE KWANDEBELE 9, THE 2 PEOPLE DESCRIBED AS POLICEMEN & WIFE FROM HAMMANSKRAAL RICHARD & IRENE MOTASE, AND SCHEEPERS MORUDI
[NOTE SPELLING OF NAMES INCORRECT]
11.10.07 READING NNAMES OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
11.12.15 MPUMELELO NYOKA REPRESENTING FAMILY OF THE PEPCO 3 MATTER
11.13.00 LINDA ? REPRESENTING PEPCO 3 MATTER FROM PORT ELIZABETH
11.13.44 ROELF MEINTJIES REPRESENTING MR JJH VAN JAARSVELD, IDENTIFIED AS CAPTAIN VAN JAARSVELD RE: INCIDENT OF PIET NTHULI & ANY OTHER INCIDENTS - HE IS A STATE WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASE
11.15.26 COMMISSIONERS LISTENING
11.17.52 CRONJE'S LAWYER, ROELOF DU PLESSIS MAKING LEGAL ARGUMENTS
11.18.48 MEINTJIES STATING THAT VAN JAARSVELD IS IN AUDIENCE AND AVAILABLE TO GIVE EVIDENCE BUT THE STATE IS OPPOSED TO IT - BUT COMMISSION MUST DECIDE WHETHER STATE WITNESSES SHOULD GIVE EVIDENCE OR NOT
11.23.00 BRIGADIER CRONJE READING FROM HIS STATEMENT [PAGE 8]
11.25.04 ...1976 SOWETO RIOTS I was never involved in any of these riots...not involved in any cases where activists were killed or dealt with in any other way. I was also not directly involved in the interrogation of activists...was second in command of the security branch in Springs...
11.25.39 re: UDF
11.26.08 ...the SA gov approach was that there was a total onslaught against the country...
11.26.47 LISTING ACTS BY ACTIVISTS EG NECKLACE MURDERS ETC. - THESE ACTIONS HAD TO BE COUNTERED
11.27.10 ...the SAP were forced at that stage to act in a way which was not in line with normal conduct in times of peace...to act outside normal policing channels as well as outside the confines of the legal system...
11.27.32 The nature of the events as they escalated, therfore led to a blurring of the distinction between lawful and unlawful actions and objectives. It was necessary & approved that the SAP used methods and act in ways which would not be acceptable in normal peace times.
11.27.52 The training of the SAP also had to be adapted to focus more on the military component of training...especially applicable to people involved in the security branch...
11.28.37 ...espionage was the order of the day...
11.28.42 ...from the above it is clear that there were gross violations of human rights on both sides of the spectrum... EXAMPLES OF THAT BY ANC
11.29.07 ...1983 to 1989 ...members of the SAP during that period had to be indoctrinated, had to be persuaded that what had to be done under the circumstances, had to be done with one objective namely, to protect and maintain the State and the National Party...
11.29.47 ...normal policing functions therefore took a backseat in these ciurcumstances...
11.30.21 32 BATALLION, SPECIAL FORCES, KOEVOET
11.30.48 ...it was members of the security police who were most involved in multiple violation of human rights necessitated by the circumstances...
11.33.02 LAWYER REFERRING TO STATISTICS OF ACTS BY LIBERATION MOVEMENT
11.34.22 re: MOTOR CAR BOMB IN CHURCH STREET PRETORIA 20/05/83
11.37.55 CRONJE CONTINUES READING STATEMENT
11.38.05 ...it happened that from time to time general orders were given to commanding officers to be given to their subordinants to take steps to combat certain situations. Such orders were general orders which didn't necessarily include specific authorization for each and every operation to be undertaken.
11.38.30 The authority to issue orders was delegated further down the structureof command and the brigadier, the position which I found myself... were increasingly confronted with general orders i.t.o which action had to be taken on a broader basis than what would normally be the case. The powers were extended & commanding officers were allowed greater degree of discretion before authority had to be obtained...
11.40.12 ...the powers which we recieved from head office were of such a nature that we assumed that the commanding officers could excercise their own discretion to issue orders...
11.40.39 COMMISSIONER ASKING WHO THE PERSON WAS WHO ISSUED THESE GENERAL ORDERS?
11.40.54 CRONJE SAYING THAT WILL DEAL WITH IT FURTHER ON IN THE STATEMENT
11.41.09 PAGE 14 SECOND PARAGRAPH CONTINUES
11.41.15 ...actions of the SAP to combat the onslaught...in so far as subordinants under my command took such action aimed at fighting the war...I am morally obliged to assume responsibility for that. All actions of my subordinants within the confines of Brigadier Victor's command, which I now will deal with:
11.42.02 ...early 1986 I was contacted by Brig Victor...was my senior and I would have been compelled to accept orders and instructions from him. He told me that he had called in Captain Jarques Hechter and gave him the instruction, along with his son, to bring the riots in Pretoria under control. It didn't matter how it was done and what was done. He said that Pretoria was burning and that SA was burning. He said that all necessary steps should be taken to normilise the situation...and further said that if a policeman house was attacked, immediate steps had to be taken against the person responsible...
11.43.00 ...such a person's house would have to be burnt down as well. His orders were to the effect that when we retaliated, we should go a step further than the enemy each time.
11.43.08 His instructions amounted to the security police taking active steps in the struggle against terrorists and activists. What his orders in reality amounted to was that the same methods had to be used and that there was in reality an active guerilla war to be waged...
11.43.56 ...at the stage of Brig Victor's command it was clear that reactionary conduct was not sufficient...from that stage onwards use was made of guerilla warfare tactics... - Copyright Holder: REUTERS